

Subject:- Advisory - Prevention against Supply Chain Attack (Advisory No. 34)

1. **Context.** In the wake of Sunburst malware attack (December 2020), prevention of supply chain attacks has become pivotal for sensitive organizations. Such attacks occur when a cyber-threat actor infiltrates a software vendor's network and injects malicious code in the software prior to its distribution to the customers. The infected software eventually compromises the customer's data / system. Due to **complexity of detection** and **trusted nature of vendor's software**, it becomes difficult to determine the **software supply chain attack**. Therefore, **recommendations** at **Para 4** may be followed to prevent software supply chain attacks.

2. **Techniques - Software Supply Chain Attack**

- a. **Hijacking Updates.** Software vendors typically **distribute updates** to customers from **centralized servers** as a routine part of product maintenance. Threat actors can **hijack** an update by **infiltrating the vendor's network** followed by either injecting **malware** into the **outgoing update** or altering the update to **grant** the threat actor **control** over the software's functionality.
- b. **Undermining Code Signing.** Code Signing is used to **validate** the **identity / integrity** of the code's author. In such cases, attackers undermine code signing by **self-signing certificates, breaking signing systems** or **exploiting misconfigured** account access controls. By undermining code signing, threat actors are able to successfully hijack software updates by impersonating a trusted vendor and inserting malicious code.
- c. **Compromising Open-Source Code.** **Open-Source Code** compromises occur when threat actors insert **malicious code** into **publicly accessible libraries**, which are afterward used by ordinary developers in their own code without knowing its harmful consequences.

3. **Consequences of Software Supply Chain Attacks.** The consequences of Software Supply Chain attack can be severe such as: -

- a. Threat actors use the **compromised software Vendor to Gain privileged and persistent access** to a victim's network.
- b. By compromising a software vendor, the attackers **bypass perimeter security measures** like borders routers, firewalls etc and gain initial access.
- c. If threat actors loses network access, they may **re-enter** a network using the **compromised software vendor**.
- d. As a follow on action, threat actor may **inject additional tailored malware packages** into a **chosen target**.
- e. The additional malware may allow threat actor to conduct various malicious

activities that may include performing **data** or **financial** theft, **monitoring individuals** or **organization** and **disabling** networks or systems.

4. Recommendations

a. **Actions by Customer / Organizations.** Organizations acquiring software should consider its use in the context of a risk management program; **Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management (C-SCRM)**. In addition, following best practices may be opted: -

1. Integrate C-SCRM across the organization and establish a formal C-SCRM program: -
 - a. Identify **key mission** or business processes; what essential services does the organization provide.
 - b. Maintain an **inventory of own organization's current and future software licenses**.
 - c. Research and document how each **software license** is **supported** by its **suppliers**; are **patches** provided? Does the **supplier offer periodic email updates** about the product?
 - d. Understand how your **organization's software supports** or is related to **organization's key processes**?
 - e. **Document to address software** for which a **vulnerability** is disclosed.
2. Know and manage **critical components** and **suppliers**.
3. Understand the **organization's supply chain**.
4. Closely collaborate with key suppliers.
5. Include **key, suppliers** in **resilience** and **improvement** activities.
6. **Asses** and **monitor** throughout the supplier relationship.
7. Organization/ customer should request a **software component inventory** with each contemplated software purchase.
8. If a vendor cannot provide a **component inventory** of its software / hardware, consider using that as a differentiator when selecting among competing products.

b. **Actions by Software Vendor.** Software vendor must implement and follow a **software development life cycle (SDLC)** in course of software supply. The vendor must prepare **secure software development**. Guidelines are as under: -

1. Defining **software development security requirements**.

2. Establish **Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF)** roles and responsibilities within the SDLC.
3. Automating **developer, security toolchain** and establishing **software security criteria** and process to collect the data necessary for security checks.
4. **Software Operational Aspects**
 - a. Strict **application** and **IP whitelisting** of vendor's software should be performed. Vendor must provide list of **IPs and URLs** allowed to communicate with provided software and all other communication/ application access may be restricted / blocked.
 - b. Vendor should perform in-house and third-party code review, analysis, and testing before every release of software.
 - c. Vendors should provide a mechanism for **verifying software release integrity** (in particular, the protection of the code signing certificate) to help customers ensure that the software being acquired is not subjected to tampering.
 - d. Vendor should timely provide vulnerability information to organization point of contact as soon as the vulnerability information becomes available.

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